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## **The Futuristic Philosophy of Anti-Natalism**

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### **ABSTRACT**

This paper focuses on the philosophy of anti-natalism which is emerging as a modern-world ideology today. The arguments put forward by philosophers and thinkers such as David Benatar, who became one of the most proliferate faces in the advocacy of anti-natalism, is highlighted throughout the paper. It seeks to draw conclusions on the theory of life and the different perspectives brought by researchers and scholars who disagreed with the claim that procreation is wrong. The paper also sheds light on ethics and its importance in the world, along with the relevance of the topic of anti-natalism. Apart from these, two hypothetical arguments will be put forward which I will do my best to defend, keeping the scope of philosophy in mind. Concepts of logic will also be implemented in the paper.

### **INTRODUCTION-**

“Ethics, also called moral philosophy, the discipline concerned with what is morally good and bad and morally right and wrong. The term is also applied to any system or theory of moral values or principles.”<sup>1</sup> The broad scope of ethics deals with the nature of ultimate worth and the criteria by which human behaviour can be judged right or wrong. Ethics has also diversified into disciplines of anthropology, sociology and theology due to its practical nature. Since ethics is not a question of factual experience in the same way as the sciences and other branches of inquiry are, it remains distinct from them. Rather, it is concerned with deciding the essence of normative theories and applying these sets of concepts to real-life moral issues. Ethics are also often used as synonyms for morals. According to Thomas Hobbes’s definition, a person can prove his ethical judgement, with finality, by showing that he is not making an introspective error about his desires.<sup>2</sup> Thus, this is a nominal definition of ethics because it describes the meaning of the word ‘ethics’. Ethical questions differ from situation to situation, where questioning the good or bad around us leads to conclusions. Questions such as whether or not it is good to enjoy one’s life while a part of the population lives in peril, or the entire concept of “good” is spoken about at length in many scholars’ works. Hobbes believes that a thing is good if it meets the desire of the person utilising it.<sup>3</sup>

The question of whether abstaining from procreation is considered ethical in society or not, is also an example of an ethical argument. The contributions of David Benatar and his study on the argument of anti-natalism has paved the way for many like-minded people to consider his

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<sup>1</sup> Singer, Peter. "Ethics". *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2 Feb. 2021, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethics-philosophy>. Accessed 10 April 2021.

<sup>2</sup> Stevenson, Charles Leslie. "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms." *Mind*, vol. 46, no. 181, 1937, p. 17. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/2250027](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2250027). Accessed 10 Apr. 2021.

<sup>3</sup> Cooper, Julie E. "Thomas Hobbes on the Political Theorist's Vocation." *The Historical Journal*, vol. 50, no. 3, 2007, pp. 519–547. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/20175110](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20175110). Accessed 13 Apr. 2021.

theory as valid and practical. There is a noticeable shift of thought from the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and there is an increase of nuclear families in today's age. There are many contributing factors to this, such as insufficient money to provide the child with a high standard of living, or choosing to prioritize one's profession over family.

#### **AIMS AND OBJECTIVES-**

- 1) To understand the concept of anti-natalism and its development in modern times
- 2) To study the contribution of David Benatar
- 3) To pose arguments against the concept of anti-natalism and justify them
- 4) To understand the criticism about anti-natalism by researchers and philosophers

#### **HYPOTHESIS-**

Anti-natalism is a threat to the preservation and continuation of mankind.

#### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY-**

This paper uses analytical research methodology to arrange facts and arguments perpetuated by scholars and philosophers. The current paper depends heavily on the book by David Benatar, philosophical journals and established scholars in the field of philosophy. To make the findings of the study to reach at the meaningful conclusion, an attempt has been made to discuss, examine, evaluate and critically secondary information through reliable sources according to the journal rankings for philosophy.

#### **REVIEW OF LITERATURE-**

- 1) *Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence.*<sup>4</sup>

Benatar's introductory chapter in his book starts with the Jewish saying 'Life is so terrible, it would have been better not to have been born. Who is so lucky? Not one in a hundred thousand!' It sets the tone for his book which explores many positive aspects of anti-natalism and associates being born into existence as a serious harm, in all circumstances. He regards that choosing not to procreate in order to avoid further pain and suffering of the human race, is not a selfish, but an altruistic motive. His theory also expands to the fact that a person experiences good and bad in their life, but the bad always seems to outweigh the good. Benatar's book has been heavily criticized and contemplated by other philosophers who specialize around the ethics of procreation. His arguments are detailed, and analyse the concept of birth, and why the human race, specifically, must be terminated.

- 2) *Reasons and Persons.*<sup>5</sup>

This book challenges, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity. The author claims that we have a false view of our own nature; that it is often rational to act against our own best interests; that most of us have

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<sup>4</sup> Benatar, David. *Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence*. 1st ed., Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 1-22.

<sup>5</sup> Parfit, Derek. *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford University Press, USA, 1986, pp. 382-387.

moral views that are directly self-defeating; and that, when we consider future generations the conclusions will often be disturbing. He puts forward his theory termed as the ‘Down Escalator Case’, where the quality of life would see a boost, if population is kept stable. He concludes that modern non-religious moral philosophy is a young subject, with a promising but unpredictable future.

3) *Did Someone Say “Babies”?*<sup>6</sup>

This poem is part of an anthology by Ogden Nash, which shows the concept of anti-natalism in light-hearted humour. His satirical take on the people who procreate and expect others to do as well, because they consider themselves to be of worth when they bring a life into existence, is compared to the swarm of flies that are birthed. In further stanzas, he writes that people would be able to bring out the best in themselves if they didn’t have to focus on the upbringing of their offspring. Nash’s short yet well-structured poem tries to convey the thought of anti-natalism and how people procreate for selfish purposes.

4) *Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility.*<sup>7</sup>

Jason Marsh’s chapter titled ‘Procreative Ethics and the Problem of Evil’ provides some insight about procreation with respect to theism, knowledge of God and evil forces. He states that a majority 85% of philosophers are atheists or agnostic, and a contributing reason for that is the presence of evil. He also notes that while anti-natalists form a minority compared to the vast majority of pro-natalists, there also exists a much smaller section that believe in procreative skepticism who remain uncertain about the moral status of procreation. Additionally, he breaks down David Benatar’s arguments and summarizes Benatar’s argument that unpopulated worlds are more preferable than populated worlds with even the slightest hint of evil in them. Thus, this journal article generates further philosophical debate about the ethics surrounding birth and the concept of ‘evil’.

5) *Why Have Children?: The Ethical Debate*<sup>8</sup>

In her novel, Christine Overall bases her argument by stating that the onus of proof on the question ‘why to have children’ lies on the people, rather than stating reasons as to why not. In modern society, people find a plethora of reasons about not wanting to bear children, but do not put much thought or justification into why they have children. She states that sentient beings do not like to suffer and are capable of joy and fulfilment, so this is the main evidence we have, to draw ethical conclusions from them. She also explores the concept of feminism, how women endure more than men and how they have little to no say in the decision to procreate. She does not fully advocate for procreation, but states that many factors need to be considered before bringing another life into the world; something that most people do not consider.

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<sup>6</sup> Nash, Ogden. *Candy Is Dandy: The Best of Ogden Nash*. Andre Deutsch Ltd, 1994.

<sup>7</sup> Marsh, Jason. “Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 89, no. 2, 2014, pp. 436–466., [www.jstor.org/stable/24672870](http://www.jstor.org/stable/24672870). Accessed 12 Apr. 2021.

<sup>8</sup> Overall, Christine. *Why Have Children?: The Ethical Debate*. The MIT Press, 2012, pp. 117-205.

6) *Procreation, Adoption and the Contours of Obligation.*<sup>9</sup>

In this journal article, the author puts forward his view called ‘Anti-Natal Pro-Adoption’. He states that anti-natalism is gaining recognition now and procreation is always met with positivity, even when the parents are not ready to give that much of commitment to raising a child, but still decide to have kids just so they can continue their bloodline. According to him, there is no reason for humans to continue their lineage, and should instead seek to help and shelter those who already exist and are need of a family. He also mentions that there is a moral obligation to not procreate, but if one experiences instincts to be a parental figure in another’s life, they should choose to adopt.

### **CHAPTER 1: THE CONCEPT OF ANTI-NATALISM**

One of the first people to coin the word ‘anti-natalism’ was David Benatar, a South African philosopher. His findings are detailed in his book ‘Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence’. He believes that procreation, in all forms and across all species, is wrong.

Through this paper, I try to put forward the argument that procreation in some circumstances is not wrong and mankind needs to continue, for a multitude of reasons. This proposition is a particular affirmative proposition as I state reasons why people who are certain that they can provide a child with a decent standard of living and are able to take up the responsibility of parenting should procreate, if they choose to. In the form of a statement, “Some people should procreate” is my proposition. The argument I pose is an inductive argument as I do not fully agree with the concept of anti-natalism. The contribution of David Benatar has provided insight into his reasoning for the advocacy of anti-natalism across all species. However, my inductive argument analyses his work, along with the views of other philosophers and situations where anti-natalism is discussed and conclusions are broadly drawn based on the data available. The premise of the concept of anti-natalism itself is not true for all, thus the conclusions drawn from it cannot be certain. In the form of a syllogism, the argument of anti-natalists can be stated as “Procreation is bad. Procreation harms sentient beings. Therefore, sentient beings are bad.” The first two statements, if considered to be true, do not logically explain the conclusion.

Anti-natalism has been referenced in scriptures of the Bible, with statements such as “I envy those who are dead and gone; they are better off than those who are still alive. But better off than either are those who have never been born, who have never seen the injustice that goes on in this world.” This verse from the book of Ecclesiastes shows that anti-natalist thoughts have not originated in the modern world but have existed (ironically) since centuries.

In India, the concept of anti-natalism gained some momentum after Raphael Samuel, a businessman from Mumbai, brought a lawsuit against his parents in 2019 for giving birth to

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<sup>9</sup> Rieder, Travis N. “Procreation, Adoption and the Contours of Obligation.” *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, vol. 32, no. 3, 2015, pp. 293–309. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/26813113](http://www.jstor.org/stable/26813113). Accessed 12 Apr. 2021.

him.<sup>10</sup> His reasoning for the same extends to the harm that overpopulation causes to the environment and also the troubles that one has to endure for the duration of their lifetime. According to him, the birth of a child could have been replaced by purchasing a toy or adopting a pet. Although there was no malice in his intentions to sue his parents, he wanted to bring the idea of anti-natalism to the mainstream media, to make people question “why” they felt the need to have babies, and the morality behind procreation.

Due to the rise in climate crises and global warming, including emission of carbon footprints, climate activists equally support the decision to ethically not reproduce. They believe that overpopulation is extremely harmful for the environment and they approve of anti-natalism because there is no need for future generations to suffer the downfall of nature which was caused by their forefathers. Trevor Hedberg, an applied ethics philosopher, writes that the issue with overpopulation isn't essentially the birth of one or two people, but the multiplication of bad habits and morals pertaining to the treatment of the environment by the continuation of generations.<sup>11</sup>

Most anti-natalists echo similar thoughts about the damage that procreation can cause to the barely functioning environment, and that there isn't enough capacity for the Earth to accommodate another doomed generation who will have to face serious environmental issues that they did not ask for. Anti-natalists and climate activists both have separate reasons to believe that procreation is wrong, but this is their common ground.

We owe duty of beneficence to people, existing and the ones who are resultants of procreation.<sup>12</sup> If our present conditions allows for us to provide a good life to someone else, we owe a duty of beneficence to them. Beneficence can be defined as the concept of achieving or guaranteeing the welfare of a particular person in a situation to be morally correct. This beneficence helps in strengthening the argument that if one does not have the time, intention or sufficient resources for the upbringing of a child, they should abstain from procreating. Imposing a burden of unnecessary pain and suffering for that person who has been denied beneficence from the result of procreation is highly avoidable.

## **CHAPTER 2: DAVID BENATAR'S PHILOSOPHY**

Essentially, David Benatar introduced and popularized the term “anti-natalism” in his 2006 book ‘Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence’. He placed his theory termed as “The Asymmetry Between Pain and Pleasure”. He argues that life in all forms is bad and it is unethical to procreate for the simple reasons that every human entails some amount of pain during their lifetime, and such pain is bad.

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<sup>10</sup>Pandey, Geeta. “Indian Man to Sue Parents for Giving Birth to Him.” *BBC News*, 7 Feb. 2019, [www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-47154287](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-47154287).

<sup>11</sup> Hedberg, Trevor. *The Environmental Impact of Overpopulation: The Ethics of Procreation*. 1st ed., Routledge, 2020.

<sup>12</sup> Gardner, Molly. “Beneficence and Procreation.” *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*, vol. 173, no. 2, 2016, pp. 321–336., [www.jstor.org/stable/24703886](http://www.jstor.org/stable/24703886). Accessed 12 Apr. 2021.

<b>Scenario A (X exists)</b>	<b>Scenario B (X never exists)</b>
(1) Presence of pain (Bad)	(3) Absence of pain (Good)
(2) Presence of pleasure (Good)	(4) Absence of pleasure (Not bad)

David Benatar argues that the presence of pain for someone who exists, is bad in all circumstances and the presence of pleasure is good, as seen in the first two quadrants. However, if that person never existed, they wouldn't know pain or the concept of 'bad' thus they would not have any absence of pleasure, which would make it 'not good' but not bad either, as they are not deprived of any pleasure in the first place. His book and theories are mostly centred around this hypothesis that sentient beings will always feel pain and that pain often overpowers the pleasure in one's life. The fact that an existing person enjoys their life does not matter in comparison to not existing at all, because no one would have been deprived of that joy, and there would be no pain. The quality of one's life does not matter that much, but the distribution of good and bad in the lifetime of a person plays an important role in determining whether their coming into existence is bad or not. For example, if someone experienced a significant amount of good for the first few years of their life in equal intensities but later faced troubles and downfalls in a higher intensity, even if there was some good in intervals, the presence of 'bad' in their life is more than the 'good'.

I do not particularly agree with this proposition, as the quality of someone's life partly does influence their initial and continual years in the world. Take for example the Kardashian-Jenner clan, a multimillionaire family which, at least from the outside, does not appear to have a shortage of the best pleasures in the world. Any reasonable person could visibly concur that the children born in that family are swimming in wealth and have a very high standard of living. Their bad experiences may not always overshadow the good that their parents have inherited for them, even in the long run. That does not invalidate them as sentient beings, but their ways of coping with a not-so-favourable situation will be easier than a kid born with congenital HIV in the slums of Mumbai.

He has a pro-death view towards abortion and also advocates for the practice of abortion in the early months of pregnancy to avoid a life that is clouded with suffering. Benatar further explains why life is always bad, with the uncertainty of natural disasters occurring at any minute, the deformities of a child at birth and having to continue living with that deformity until it is treated or at least bearable to endure, being murdered, raped, maimed, or subjected to genital mutilation at birth, all constitutes the evils of coming into existence. My counter argument would be that, when there is a better quality of population that is not a product of uneducated or irresponsible parents who do not raise their children well, these man-made issues would, for the most part, not arise. Due to technological advancements, natural

disasters can now be forecasted and predicted. Japan's resilience in obstructing frequent earthquakes should be lauded and encourage others to follow suit.

### **CHAPTER 3: CRITICISM ON ANTI-NATALIST PHILOSOPHY**

Elizabeth Harman strongly opposed the anti-natalist theory of David Benatar.<sup>13</sup> She pointed out the flaws in his Asymmetry theory where she states that there is good and bad in every life, and bringing someone into existence does not mean that we harm them; the conclusion would rather be that we have done something impersonally worse by giving life to them, than making sure that they did not exist. 'Harm' doesn't come into question because in general, the individual is prone to have more of the 'good' than the 'bad' in their life. She also notes that in the fourth quadrant of the Asymmetry diagram, the absence of pleasure should not be termed as 'not good', as we do not have a comparison of the summation of good's and bad's in an existing person and non-existent person. There are higher quality pleasures which alleviate the level of pleasure in one's life and in comparison to the bad, these good things overpower the bad. She argues however, that there is a duty of not procreating when one knows that they are imposing a life of burdens to their offspring. That is morally wrong.

Bennett Foddy also explains that the theory of never coming into existence is weaker in comparison of being conceived.<sup>14</sup> He states that existence is better than non-existence, depending on the state of the person in question. It is hard to examine how a person's well-being would reduce from a high to lower level, if they are non-existent. Thus, one's conception could arguably be considered as better than if they were not conceived at all. This acts as a catalyst for my argument that only some people should procreate, as life does include good and bad, but the good is marginally better than the bad.

Saul Smilansky provides some insight towards David Benatar's philosophy and agrees that there are some asymmetries that occur among people who are born and those who do not see the face of the earth.<sup>15</sup> He explores the idea that if someone were to experience extreme happiness, or find something ethereal such as a beautiful location, one would often want others to experience and partake in that sight of pleasure too. He also counters Benatar's premise which revolves around the theory that all lives have more bad than good in them. Smilansky, however, argues that this is not the case for a significant amount of people. Coping with the 'bad' in one's life can be through psychological help of facing *reality* and not existence. I strongly agree with his review as I believe that existence is not to be questioned when bad things happen in a person's life, rather solutions to overcome that obstacle and be met with happiness or satisfaction can outweigh the bad that one has experienced.

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<sup>13</sup> Harman, Elizabeth. "Reviewed Work: Better Never To Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence by David Benatar." *Nous*, vol. 43, no. 4, 2009, pp. 776–785. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/40660445](http://www.jstor.org/stable/40660445). Accessed 12 Apr. 2021.

<sup>14</sup> Foddy, Bennett. "IN DEFENSE OF A TEMPORAL ACCOUNT OF HARM AND BENEFIT." *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 51, no. 2, 2014, pp. 155–165. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/24475438](http://www.jstor.org/stable/24475438). Accessed 12 Apr. 2021.

<sup>15</sup> Smilansky, Saul. *The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)*, vol. 58, no. 232, 2008, pp. 569–571. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/40208656](http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208656). Accessed 12 Apr. 2021.

Lastly, the philosopher whose views most resonated with mine was Aaron Smuts. His observations of Benatar's work is commendable and he provides strong counter arguments to the Asymmetry theory.<sup>16</sup> He argues that coming into existence is not always a net harm. If a person whose life is worth living, is brought to life, then ethically we have not wronged them. The benefit in one's life is determined by the cumulative objective highs and lows in their life. If the objective highs surpass the objective lows, then that life is worth living. The exact opposite of this is the group of 'lives worth avoiding'. There is a moral obligation to not procreate when one knows the bad implications that it can have to the resultant child. In general, most lives fall under the first category of 'lives worth living'.

David Benatar published a journal entry, responding to these critics and acknowledged their observations on his theory. He placed further propositions, trying to distinguish his point from what they are trying to claim.<sup>17</sup>

#### **CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHETICAL ARGUMENTS AND DEFENCES**

The first hypothetical argument that can be formed on the basis of my thesis is, why only some lives? Why does a standard of living or resources need to be present for a person to have a life worth living? There are people who are born into poverty and meagre quality of life, and they also go on to achieve brilliant conquests due to their talent and skill.

My response to this would be that these incidents are very rare, although it does constitute as an exception. Children born in the worst of conditions take years to escape social and family pressures, often forced to beg for a meal every day till they are of attainable age to work by themselves but even then, they are walloped by the world. The contrast between the number of intellectually gifted children being born compared to the ones already existing and who can avail of these opportunities is visible and the latter is significantly higher. The world would not be devoid of these rare exceptions, as they are not yet born and the risk of procreating even further to then weed out these rare exceptions brings us back to the thesis that harm is caused once there is life. It becomes a moral duty to ensure that the upbringing of a child is not compromised, and parents or guardians can provide stability to the child.

The second hypothetical argument that could arise is, most human beings have desires to procreate. How can we limit some of them and grant moral permission to others to procreate?

To this, like philosopher Travis Rieder, I support the idea of adoption. It does become a moral responsibility to not procreate when we purposely harm one's life, even if it isn't on purpose. Orphaned and abandoned children who already exist needn't suffer more misery due to the lack of concern by their biological parents. Children that do not exist can be saved from the pressure of continuing their bloodline and adopted children can have lives worth living if

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<sup>16</sup> Smuts, Aaron. "To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living." *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, vol. 17, no. 4, 2014, pp. 711–729. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/24478599](http://www.jstor.org/stable/24478599). Accessed 13 Apr. 2021.

<sup>17</sup> Benatar, David. "Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics." *The Journal of Ethics*, vol. 17, no. 1/2, 2013, pp. 121–151. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/42630950](http://www.jstor.org/stable/42630950). Accessed 13 Apr. 2021.

they are kept in the care of responsible and sentient parents. This can slowly help in erasing the stigma associated with adoption and the practice of abortion when it is necessary.

## **CONCLUSION**

Based on the facts and theories put forward by many applied philosophers and adding my own inputs to perpetuate my point that some people should procreate, my hypothesis is proved correct. The entire concept of anti-natalism is quite absolutist and doesn't leave much room for one to contemplate that the simpler pleasures of life can also outweigh the harsh realities of existence. Although I stated points as to why people who only have resources and an intention to properly nurture for the resultant child should consider procreating, it does not make the existing children who live in poor conditions invalid. Their definition of happiness might vary from ours, as they are not born with a silver spoon. Not to mention that these people constitute some of the core workers in our day to day life, who help in supplying essential manpower and goods and are essentially the reason why most people can claim to have a "good life which is worth living." Through this paper, I did not want to advocate for suicide or any extreme anti-natalist views that weren't in tandem with ethics or what someone would consider as morally right. My research on David Benatar's work helps me understand rather, that the end of the world is certain. As there is life, so is there death. According to David Benatar, death is the very presence of bad in one's life. But this is not something that we don't already know. The end of the world may take years or (less likely) centuries. As per my reasoning, there should continue to be life till then, to explore and marvel the works of people before us and the people who will acknowledge our contribution once we cease to exist too. Keeping theology i.e. the study of God and other religious entities aside, the end of the world is slowly drawing closer, at least on Earth. The burden of overpopulation is noticeable in the world, with a splurge of cases concerning environmental abuse and replenishment of natural resources. This is the reason that I stated that only "some" people "should" procreate because, I do not support the entire philosophy of anti-natalism, but I see no benefit of people whose lives will be constantly tainted by suffering, to be born. Taking this into consideration too, there will undoubtedly be cases where one's illness or the criteria of knowing if one's life is worth living or not will not be apparent before the conception of that child, and those lives must continue too, should they choose to live. Satisfying one's philosophical beliefs and documenting them to help other people support their argument does not diminish the fact that human beings are still a part of the planet and have evolved from something. If there was no need for them, their conception and formation would never have existed since the beginning of time. That would be the equivalent of stating something hypothetical like aliens or mythical creatures from folklore. Humans are very much real, and pain is an essential part of everyone's life. Sometimes, overcoming that pain can lead to immeasurable pleasure which David Benatar talks about. My inductive argument has aimed to broaden the scope of the philosophy of anti-natalism. I did not draw a conclusion to Benatar's work specifically, because I do not consider his thesis to be true. Instead, there could be a broad range of reasons why procreation or abstaining from procreation is ethically right or wrong. The way I see it, the modern generation who are of age to become parents see

a common pattern of replacing the idea of a family with prioritizing their career. However, some regressive families that still impose archaic practices of procreation on women need a reality check. This is required because procreation should be by *choice*. People should be prepared to raise their offspring in a manner which would ultimately contribute to the good of the world. Conceiving children and leaving them in the care of meshes or begging on the streets for a significant part of their childhood is as good as neglecting them a very integral part of their life. Although I do not agree with the concept of anti-natalism, it is admirable how David Benatar was the torchbearer for this train of thought in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. After all, Benatar wouldn't have been able to perpetuate his theory and spark this ethical debate, had he not been born.

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